Basra and beyond

Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has received a lot of criticism in the American press for his decision to engage Iranian-backed lawless forces in Basra, in an operation whose outcome is still up in the air. Some of the points being made against the prime minister's planning and execution may be fair. But he deserves firm support for his stand. A democratic Iraqi government — or indeed, any Iraqi government — cannot succeed if it allows independent militias to exist, much less to operate with impunity.

It matters, in short, who wins this battle. On the positive side, Iraqi army units carried out a nearly incident-free show of force in Basra Wednesday. Despite an unsuccessful roadside bomb attack on a vehicle carrying the top Iraqi commander and other minor incidents, the Iraqi move through a neighborhood formerly controlled by an Iranian-backed militia, the Mahdi Army, seemed to show progress toward Mr. al-Maliki's goal of restoring government-controlled order in Basra.

Some critics have questioned whether the prime minister or the head of the Mahdi Army came off better in this affair. There can be little question that the prime minister — that is to say, the Iraqi government — has come out ahead. The Mahdi Army nominally reports to Iraqi cleric and political leader Muqtada al-Sadr, who on Sunday ordered his followers throughout Iraq to cease fire. Four years ago, al-Sadr urged his followers to attack U.S. forces throughout southern Iraq. This time, from self-imposed exile in Iran, he ducked a fight. Moreover, a report by McClatchy Newspapers suggests that Iran's Revolutionary Guards force may now have more control than al-Sadr over the Mahdi Army.

The Mahdi Army and the Iranian armed and trained Special Groups associated with it are not defeated in Basra or elsewhere. But they have suffered heavy losses fighting the Iraqi army, and the government continues to demand that they disarm and disband. The prime minister's declaration that these Shiite militias are "worse than al-Qaida" should be welcome to Iraq's embattled Sunnis as well as to American forces that have been militia targets.

Muqtada al-Sadr remains a popular figure among Iraq's Shiites, with a strong following in Baghdad's poorest neighborhoods, including Sadr City, named after his father. The government's attempt to wrest control of Basra from illegal militias probably did little to diminish his appeal to this electorate. But the government's action serves to draw a line and offer al-Sadr and his followers a choice: operate within the constitution as a legitimate but unarmed political party, or face the consequences.

The timing of the Basra operation, although criticized by some, appears to have been wisely designed to lay this choice on the table well in advance of regional and local elections now widely anticipated to occur later this year. Step by messy but welcome step, the Iraqi government now seems to be moving ahead on an ambitious, and democratic, agenda.